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Despite their clear and significant vulnerability to climate change, small
island developing states have not had the opportunity to pursue in earnest a
remedy for the impacts of that change. All small island developing states
face signficant challenges to their economic well-being and the availability
of basic resources-including food and water. Some face the loss of
habitability of their entire territory. Identifying and implementing adequate
repair will be difficult enough. After at least two decades of knowledge of
these impacts, however, small island developing states still face the equally
difficult task of just getting their claims heard. This is not for want of
trying. Indeed, there has been extensive research and scholarship as well
as abbreviated attempts in international fora to hold large emitters
accountable. These have not been effective. Further, the latest attempt to
clarify the legal responsibility of the largest emitters has been met with
threats of reprisal by those large emitters. This kind of intimidation,
coupled with a weak international legal regime at base, delays justice for
small island developing states.
In this article, Professor Burkett explores the failure of the legal regime
to provide adequate process and substantive remedy for small island
developing states-either through the absence of viable legal theories,
capacity constraints, or uneven power dynamics in the international
arena-or all three. She argues, however, that the costs of pursuing these
claims-and other novel approaches she outlines in the article-are
dwarfed by the costs to small island communities of unabated climate
impacts. In surveying the possible claims and introducing new approaches,
Professor Burkett attempts to respond to a striking and persistent (if
unsurprising) justice paradox: the current international legal regime
forecloses any reasonable attempts at a remedy for victims of climate
change who are the most vulnerable and the least responsible.
. Associate Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of
Hawai'i. I thank Mahina Tuteur for excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite their clear and significant vulnerability to climate change, small
island developing states (SIDS) have not had the opportunity to pursue in
earnest a remedy for the impacts of that change. This presents a justice
paradox, in which the current international legal regime forecloses any
reasonable attempts at a just remedy for the victims of climate change who
are the most vulnerable and the least responsible. Worse still, attempts to
seek justice in such clear instances of need may yield negative political
outcomes against the claimants themselves, namely the loss of aid for other
critical functions from wealthy large emitters. Nonetheless, it is still
necessary for SIDS to pursue vigorously both aggressive emissions
abatement as well assistance with managing climate impacts. This is true if
only for the likely result that climate change losses and any bold action to
mitigate or adapt to them will likely dwarf the costs of retaliation from the
wealthy that island states might face. Indeed, a survey of the basket of
remedies available to small island claimants in addition to novel approaches
this article recommends reveals possible pathways for concerted and
effective action.
All SIDS face dangerous impacts to their economic well-being and the
availability of basic resources-including food and water. Some face the
loss of all habitable territory. After at least two decades of knowledge of
these impacts, however, SIDS are unable to get their claims heard in major
legal fora-never mind the more formidable tasks of identifying and
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implementing adequate abatement and reparative measures. This is not for
wont of trying. Indeed, there has been extensive research and scholarship
on viable claims as well as abbreviated attempts in international arenas to
hold large greenhouse gas emitters accountable.' This author's early
research attempted to do the same by identifying meaningful avenues of
remedy through reconciliation and reparation.2 These efforts have not been
wholly effective to date. Yet, scholar-advocates, like Professor Jon M. Van
Dyke, insist that actions against the largest emitters are necessary in
response to the injustice of delayed or tepid climate mitigation and
adaptation for SIDS. Professor Van Dyke's passionate call to action
inspired this author to revisit the possibilities for SIDS to pursue their
claims through litigation and the courts.
Today, there are renewed efforts to invite the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") to advise on the legal responsibility of the largest emitters
vis-A-vis climate change.4 This effort by Palau, a particularly vulnerable
Pacific island state, however, has been met with threats of reprisal by the
largest historical emitter, the United States.s This kind of intimidation,
coupled with a weak international legal regime at base, delays justice for
SIDS. It lays bare the fact that in the face of one of the most poignant
instances of grave injustice-the loss of one's land, livelihood, culture, and
ancestors as a result of another's unabated emissions -our legal systems at
the international, national, and subnational level, are unable to effect a
swift, definitive, and just resolution. The absence of a clear legal pathway
coupled with fears that some countries might retaliate effectively stifle legal
action.
This article discusses the failure of the legal regime to provide adequate
process and substantive remedy for SIDS-either through the lack of viable
legal theories or through uneven power dynamics in the international arena.
Despite skepticism about its efficacy in light of present-day exigencies, the
costs of pursuing these claims-and other novel approaches the article
1 See discussion infra Part II.
2 See generally Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 509
(2009).
See Jon M. Van Dyke, Regionalism, Fisheries, and Environmental Challenges in the
Pacific, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 143 (2004).
4 Lawrence Hurley, Island Nation Girds for Legal Battle Against Industrial Emissions,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 28, 2011), www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/28/28greenwire-
island-nation-girds-for-legal-battle-against-i-60949.html.
Duncan Clark, Which Nations are Most Responsible for Climate Change?, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/20 11/apr/21/countries-
responsible-climate-change. See also Rachel Brown, The Rising Tide of Climate Change
Cases, THE YALE GLOBALIST (Mar. 4, 2013, 11:30 p.m.), tyglobalist.org/in-the-
magazine/theme/the-rising-tide-of-climate-change-cases/.
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introduces-are dwarfed by the costs to small island communities of
unabated climate impacts. In surveying the possible claims and introducing
new approaches, the article attempts to respond to a striking and persistent
(if unsurprising) justice paradox.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the current
science of climate change, including forecasted impacts as well as
recommendations for emissions abatement. In addition, it looks at the
severe current and forecasted climate impacts to SIDS. Part II describes the
geopolitical backdrop of claims against large emitters, which explains in
part the uphill battle SIDS face. Part III follows with a survey of the most
commonly cited claims that SIDS might pursue against the largest emitters.
Part IV introduces the possibility of identifying and pursuing claims using
unconventional plaintiffs and defendants, and even borrows from proposals
in the international economic law realm to consider the possible efficacy of
"class action litigation" to empower individual SIDS. Part IV further notes
the political milieu in which SIDS might bring these claims and considers
how the value of publicity and notions of interest converge may advance
claims beyond their prospects in the courtroom alone. In conclusion, the
article situates this paradox in the context of a larger conception of "the
justice paradox" in law as articulated by Dean Robert E. Scott.6 Dean Scott
argues that the law vacillates between meeting the needs of present justice,
on one hand, and future justice, on the other. This is a perennial sway that
we might embrace, according to Scott. I argue that if that vacillation
consistently excludes the most vulnerable, the law in its current form is
dangerously inadequate.
II. THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES
"Some scientific conclusions or theories have been so thoroughly examined
and tested, and supported by so many independent observations and results,
that their likelihood of subsequently being found to be wrong is vanishingly
small. Such conclusions and theories are then regarded as settled facts."
- U.S. National Academy of Science and Engineering, May 29, 20107
6 See generally Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 329 (1993).
7 U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 21-22 (2010).
636
2013 / A JUSTICE PARADOX
A. Climate Impacts Generally
It has been decades since the international community has been aware of
the grave risks of climate change and the imperative of brisk and aggressive
attempts to mitigate those risks, with no measurable action. During this
time venerable institutions, such as the National Academy of Sciences, have
have declared repeatedly that human-caused climate change is a settled
fact.8 Noted climate scientist Dr. James Hansen has stated that the current
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, approaching 400 parts per
million, "is already in the 'dangerous zone."9 This concentration, Hansen
states, is too high to maintain "the climate to which humanity, wildlife, and
the rest of the biosphere are adapted." 0 Additionally, there is significant
warming in the pipeline." In other words, global temperature might rise by
two to three degrees Celsius even without additional greenhouse gas
emissions. According to Hansen, "[h]umanity's task of moderating human-
caused global climate change is urgent." 2
The impacts are not solely prospective and, for all intents and purposes,
are irreversible. 3 The current, and often jarring, signs of climate disruption
are legion.14 Further, they outpace the modeling of climate phenomenon, 5
See id. ("The Earth system is warming and that much of this warming is very likely
due to human activities.").
James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric C0 2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN
ATMos. Sci. J. 217,218 (2008).
o Id. at 228.
" Id. at 226.
12 Id. at 228.
13 See generally Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon
Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, no. 6, 1704 (Feb.
10, 2009), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/106/6/1704.full.pdf+html) (stating that
climate change that takes place due to increases in carbon dioxide concentrations is largely
irreversible for 1,000 years after emissions stop). "Irreversible" is defined as a time scale
exceeding the end of the millennium in the year 3000. Id. at 1704. The study did not
consider the possibility of geo-engineering measures. Id.
14 Id. at 1709 ("Irreversible climate changes due to carbon dioxide emissions have
already taken place, and future carbon dioxide emissions would imply further irreversible
effects on the planet, with attendant long legacies for choices made by contemporary
society."). See Andrew Freedman, U.S. Dominated Global Disaster Losses in 2012: Swiss
Re, CLIMATE CENTRAL (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/us-dominated-
global-disaster-losses-in-2012-insurer-reports-15814; see also Andrew Steer, Listening to
Hurricane Sandy: Climate Change is Here, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2012, 6:52 a.m.),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-02/listening-to-hurricane-sandy-climate-change-
is-here.html; and Brad Plumer, Yes, Hurricane Sandy is a Good Reason to Worry about
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producing more significant impacts than predicted. Impacts include
changes in rainfall, with adverse effects on water supplies for humans,
agriculture and ecosystems; increased fire frequency; desertification; and,
irrevocable sea-level rise.16 The latter might be so severe that sea walls and
other measures to adapt will prove inadequate." In short, as atmospheric
scientist and key contributor to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change Susan Solomon explains, carbon dioxide emissions might peak to
levels that would lead to eventual sea-level rise in the order of meters,
"implying unavoidable inundation of many small islands and low-lying
coastal areas."
The need to rapidly draw down emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases to below current atmospheric concentrations cannot wait
until a future date if humanity is to avoid catastrophic changes.' 9 Indeed,
the period for carbon emissions to peak and then fall dramatically to avoid
these changes is rapidly closing, with less than ten years remaining to halt
emissions growth to have a palpable effect on worsening climate change.20
For Hansen, prompt policy changes are imperative,2 1 and the failure to act
suggests to him that "decision-makers do not appreciate the gravity of the
situation."22
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
("UNFCCC" or "Framework Convention"), to which the global community
committed some twenty years ago, specifically speaks to "threats of serious
1s Hansen, supra note 9, at 226.
16 See Solomon, supra note 13, at 1708.
'7 Id. (explaining that the conservative lower limit of sea-level rise, defined by thermal
expanses alone, can be expected to be associated with substantial irreversible commitments
to future changes in the geography of the Earth due to many coastal and island features
ultimately becoming submerged).
18 Id. at 1704.
19 See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 9, at 217 ("If the present overshoot of [350 parts per
million of carbon dioxide] is not brief, there is a possibility of seeding irreversible
catastrophic effects."); Solomon, supra note 13, at 1708-09 ("It is sometimes imagined that
slow processes such as climate changes pose small risks, on the basis of the assumption that
a choice can always be made to quickly reduce emissions and thereby reverse any harm
within a few years or decades. We have shown that this assumption is incorrect for carbon
dioxide emissions, because of the longevity of the atmospheric CO2 perturbation and ocean
warming.").
20 Hansen, supra note 9, at 229 (explaining that continued growth of greenhouse gas
emissions, for just another decade, practically eliminates the possibility of near-term return
of atmospheric composition beneath the tipping level for catastrophic effects).
21 Id. at 217. Hansen argues that a limit of one degree Celsius increase in global
temperature is necessary to avoid practically irreversible ice sheet and species loss. Id.
22 Id at 229.
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or irreversible damage."23 In addition, it pays particular attention to the
plight of small island states, early seen as among the most vulnerable to
climate change. If preserving a climate "similar to that on which
civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted"24 is desired,
the international community must never emit the vast majority of the
remaining fossil fuel carbon.25 This is indeed a herculean task.26 Hopes for
later and rapid reductions are, however, "risky, expensive and disruptive;"
and, as such, far less politically feasible. 27 Further, for SIDS, it may herald
the "end of their history." 28
B. Climate Change and Small Island Developing States
Leaders from the Pacific Islands Forum to the Secretary General of the
United Nations recognize the dire consequences of climate change for
SIDS, describing it as the greatest threat to livelihoods, security, and well-
being. 29 This echoes the United Nations General Assembly's repeated and
unanimous affirmation of the seriousness of climate change and the
particular vulnerability of SIDS. 0  Though geographically disparate,
23 Solomon, supra note 13, at 1704 (citing United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, at art. 3, [hereinafter UNFCCCJ,
available at http:// unfcc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf).
24 Hansen, supra note 9, at 217.
25 Id. at 226.
26 Id. at 229 ("The most difficult task, phase-out over the next twenty to twenty-five
years of coal use that does not capture CO 2, is herculean, yet feasible when compared with
the efforts that went into World War II. The stakes, for all life on the planet, surpass those
of any previous crisis. The greatest danger is continued ignorance and denial, which could
make tragic consequences unavoidable.").
27 Myles Allen et al., The Exit Strategy, 3 NATURE REPORTS: CLIMATE CHANGE 56
(2009), http://www.nature.com/climate/2009/0905/pdf/climate.2009.38.pdf.
28 Islands Fear 'End of History' Due to Climate Changes, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2010,
10:56 p.m.), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/30/us-climate-islands-idUSTRE6ATO
KW20101130. Antonio Monteiro Lima, a delegate of Cape Verde who is vice-chair of the
forty-three member Alliance of Small Island States, identified Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Cook
Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Maldives as the most at risk. Id. Monteiro stated, "All
these countries are at this moment struggling to survive . . . they are facing the end of
history[.]" Id.
29 Joint Statement by Leaders of Pacific Islands Forum, UN Secretary-General, UNITED
NATIONS, SG/2191 (Oct. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Joint Statement], available at
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sg2191 .doc.htm.
30 See Aaron Korman & Giselle Barcia, Rethinking Climate Change: Towards an
International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 35, 36 (2012)
available at http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-37-korman-barcia-rethinking-climate-change.
pdf.
31 See Tuiloma Neroni Slade, The Making of International Law: The Role of Small
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SIDS share many preexisting vulnerabilities, such as limited resources and
high vulnerability to external economic and geo-political shocks.32 These
vulnerabilities, exacerbated by climate change and coupled with low
adaptive capacity, inspired special recognition for SIDS within the
Framework Convention.33 They have also inspired "persistent and
innovative" arrangements between SIDS to facilitate cooperation and
regional collaboration,34 which may bode well for future actions against
large emitters.3 s
Among the most striking climate change impacts is the acute coastal
vulnerability of SIDS, and in some cases the almost certain uninhabitability
of their ancestral homes.3 6 In the Pacific, for example, SIDS risk many of
the more globally widespread climate impacts, including coastal inundation,
rising air temperatures, decreased rainfall, and rising ocean temperatures.37
With these climatic changes-increased coral bleaching, increased coastal
flooding, and erosion-threats to traditional lifestyles of indigenous
communities and human migration will also occur.
Islanders have long been aware of these impacts. The impassioned plea
in 1997 of the Prime Minister of Tuvalu, an atoll nation that faces the total
loss of territory, still rings true today:
Island States, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 531 (2003) ("Small island states are located in all
parts of the world, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, in Africa, Asia, the Indian Ocean,
and the Caribbean. They range from the very small (Barbados and Tuvalu) to the quite large
(Jamaica and Papua New Guinea).").
32 See generally Burkett, supra note 2; Slade, supra note 31, at 533; Alexander
Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climate Change: The End of the Line in
International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 107 (2004).
3 UNFCCC, supra note 23, art. 4.
34 Slade, supra note 31, at 533-4, 540 (citing early collaboration including the Pacific
Islands Forum, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Indian Ocean Commission
as well as more recent efforts embodied in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)).
3 See discussion infra Part IV.
36 See generally Maxine Burkett, In Search ofRefuge: Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced
Migration, and the Legal Frontier, ASIA PAC. ISSUES, no. 98, Jan. 2011, at 1. It is important
to note that coastal erosion and seawater inundation will likely render atoll islets
uninhabitable long before sea level overtops the surfaces. William R. Dickinson, Pacific
Atoll Living: How Long Already and Until When?, 19 GSA TODAY, Mar. 2009, at 4.
3 In its Fourth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
stated the changes anticipated for the small islands with "very high confidence," including
stark forecasts projecting reduced water resources in many Caribbean and Pacific islands
that would be insufficient to meet demand during low rainfall periods by mid-century.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 48-49 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 2011).
38 See generally NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REGIONAL TECHNICAL INPUT REPORT
SERIES, CLIMATE CHANGE AND PACIFIC ISLANDS: INDICATORS AND IMPACTS (Victoria W.
Keener, et al. eds., 2012).
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There is an asserted consensus that binding significant targets to reduce
greenhouse gases are essential, if the catastrophic impacts of climate change
on the livelihood and existence of people are to be limited . . . . For the
people of low-lying island states of the world, however, and certainly of my
small island country of Tuvalu in the Pacific, this is no longer a debatable
argument. The impacts of global warming on our islands are real, and are
already threatening our very survival and existence.39
Indeed, as His Excellency Tuiloma Neroni Slade, judge of the International
Criminal Court,40 stated ten years ago, sea-level rise "poses the most critical
threat, for it touches the very life force of island communities . . .
Fundamentally, it is an issue of equity, and of survival."41 The Joint
Statement by Leaders of Pacific Islands Forum and the Secretary General
echoes this sentiment in its call to the international community to identify
threats-like the violation of territorial integrity and increased natural
resource scarcity-and to assist these vulnerable countries.42  Indeed, the
Joint Statement seeks "urgent international action to reduce emissions
commensurate with the science and associated social, economic and
security impacts, sufficient to enable the survival and viability of all []
small island developing States."43 The Joint Statement also stresses the
need to address these impacts in "all relevant international forums,
including but not limited to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the General Assembly and the Security Council."" It is
not clear, however, that these forums will yield much progress. They have
not to date.
III. CREATIVITY, FUTILITY, AND REALPOLITIK
There have been many claims and avenues for remedy posited by
academics and practitioners. Pioneering individuals and communities from
39 Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in
Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the United States in the International Court of Justice, 14 PAC. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 103, 104 (2005) (citation omitted).
40 Slade, supra note 31, at 531. Judge Tuiloma Neroni Slade is a Judge on the
International Criminal Court ("ICC"). Prior to his election to the ICC, he served as the
Permanent Representative of Samoa to the United Nations and as the Samoan Ambassador
to the United States. He has also held the office of Attorney-General of Samoa, was a senior
legal advisor with the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, and was the Chairman of the
Alliance of Small Island States ("AOSIS") in 1997, which was the year that the Kyoto
Protocol agreement on controlling greenhouse gases was adopted. Id.
41 Slade, supra note 31, at 540.
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the most vulnerable regions of the world have pressed or attempted to
pursue some of these claims in international fora, though without successful
resolution. For example, the Inuit petition at the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") sought to hold the United States
responsible for human rights violations caused by its disproportionate
contribution to historical and present greenhouse gas emissions. The
claim, however, never reached conclusion and a final decision is likely not
forthcoming.4 6 In 2002, Tuvalu also threatened to bring suit in the ICJ in
response to the United States' intransigence regarding emissions
reductions.47 Of course, the ICJ's lack of jurisdiction over the United States
would have been the first major jurisdictional hurdle, followed perhaps by
several substantive law issues.4 8
Many of the remaining claims are robust in the academic realm alone.
This is the case for proposed claims under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS")49 and the U.S. Alien Torts Statute
("ATS"),50 for example. The search for a viable means for remedy
demonstrates the failure of the Framework Convention, the main
international instrument on climate change, to address the absence of
enforceable compliance mechanisms to date.5 There is a renewed effort to
pursue avenues under the UNFCCC 5 2-and Part III surveys the other most
4s See Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate
Change and Indigenous Peoples' Rights, in 272 ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky
eds.,2009); see also discussion, Part IV.A infra.
46 Id. at 289-90.
47 See Jacobs, supra note 39, at 112.
48 See id. at 105 (asserting that even if Tuvalu gains jurisdiction for a suit in the ICJ
against the United States, it will face numerous substantive law issues).
49 See id. at 116.
so See generally RoseMary Reed, Comment, Rising Seas and Disappearing Islands: Can
Island Inhabitants Seek Redress Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 11 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y
J. 399 (2002).
51 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 39, at 112 (arguing that Tuvalu would have difficulty
asserting that the United States is bound by the Framework Convention for two reasons:
First, countries may postpone such measures when they are not cost effective. The United
States would likely defend its actions by pointing to the economic hazards of substantial
emissions reduction. And, second, the Framework Convention is not binding, so the United
States could argue that it is not required to abide by its emissions standards).
52 These include employing an "obscure dispute settlement provision of the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)," under Article 14 of the treaty.
Lisa Friedman, Island States Mull Risks and Benefits ofSuing Big Emitters, E&E REP. (Nov.
16, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2012/11/16/1 (last visited Mar. 12,
2013); see also Jacobs, supra note 39, at 118.
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commonly cited legal avenues. This section, however, poses fundamental
geo-political questions that complicate these kinds of cases at the outset.
SIDS appear to have a viable claim at base: the unabated emissions
activity of the highest emitters has resulted in altered atmospheric chemistry
that in turn has created a climate extremely hostile to small island states in
particular.5 3 Further, it seems reasonable to allege that the highest emitters
were aware of the consequences of their actions since at least 1992, at the
drafting of the Framework Convention. A compelling case could proceed
on the merits. There are, however, antecedent concerns regarding the geo-
political milieu in which these cases are brought. For example, does the
complaining island nation have the financial and human resources and
capacity to pursue these claims against large emitters? And, on a related
note, if a vulnerable nation pursues legal recourse, will the very nation-
state(s) from which it seeks remedy retaliate?
There is evidence that both lack of resources and fear of retaliation have
stymied efforts to hold large emitters accountable for their actions in the
international arena.54 That may color the proposed legal actions' viability.
Backed by wealthy European nations, the Republic of Palau is currently
leading a coalition of vulnerable states in a campaign to request an advisory
opinion from the ICJ.55 The request seeks "on an urgent basis . . . an
advisory opinion from the ICJ on the responsibilities of States under
international law to ensure that activities carried out under their jurisdiction
or control that emit greenhouse gases do not damage other States."56
Reports indicate, however, that diplomats and attorneys are "putting on the
brakes" for fear of losing billions in aid from China and the United States
for non-climate needs, such as education, roads, and HIV-AIDS clinics. 57
The United States, for example, has "made its objections known," using
threats of worsening "[c]ongressional inaction as a clear warning" against
pursuing legal action. Conversations regarding more "confrontational
s3 See Friedman, supra note 52.
54 id.
5 See generally id. Palau formed Ambassadors for Responsibility on Climate Change
("ARC") to ask the General Assembly for an advisory opinion. Id. Germany, Ireland, and
Switzerland have vowed support for Palau. Id. For more in depth discussion of ICJ
advisory opinions, see discussion Part IV.D infra.
56 Press Conference on Request for International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on
Climate Change, U.N. Press Release (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on
Climate Change].
5 Friedman, supra note 52 ("'Some of them are afraid, since the big country doesn't
like it,' said Bangladesh Ambassador to the United Nations Abdul Momen. Momen and
others said the concern has not derailed nations' pursuit of an advisory opinion before the
Hague-based International Court of Justice, but it has significantly slowed the momentum.").
58 Id. In addition, the United States has a unique relationship with a number of the most
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alternatives" are occurring at the "margins" of the negotiations and the
largest impediment for poor nations, generally, is their "near-total
dependency on big emitters for development, trade and, increasingly,
money to adapt to climate change."59 Former President of Palau, Johnson
Toribiong, insists, however, that the advisory opinion would "complement
and not conflict" with international negotiations.60  This action would
perhaps "renew our faith in a system of law that has guided States' actions
in the past and gives them legitimacy today," according to President
Toribiong.
This kind of stifled voice, as a result of capacity constraints or power
differentials is not unique to climate-related circumstances, though the
consequences here are perhaps most dire. In fact, similar capacity and
retaliation concerns operate in the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
dispute settlement regime. Lack of resources and legal capacity as well as
fear of non-WTO or extralegal retaliation by more powerful trading
partners, are two of the small handful of reasons that developing nations
might not invoke the relevant dispute settlement mechanisms.6 2 The
vulnerable nations, including Palau. The Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, and Palau are freely associated with the United States, institutionalized by
respective Compacts of Free Association. See generally Briana Dema, Note, Sea Level Rise
and the Freely Associated States: Addressing Environmental Migration Under the
Compacts of Free Association, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 177, 183-85 (2012). "Free
association occupies the 'middle ground between integration and independence.' It is
characterized by a formal association between two states in which one state cedes to the
other 'a fundamental sovereign authority and responsibility for the conduct of its own
affairs."' Id. at 183 (citations omitted). Whereas Dema writes about the Compact in the
context of climate-induced migration, at least one other commentator suggests that the
Compact might be useful for limiting emissions from the "world's leading producer of
greenhouse gases." See J. Chris Larson, Note, Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the
Marshall Islands, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 495, 496-97 (2000) ("A treaty obligation exists
between [the Republic of Marshall Islands] and the United States, which, broadly
interpreted, may require the United States to defend RMI from accelerated sea-level rise.");
see also Clement Yow Mulalap, Islands in the Stream: Addressing Climate Change from a
Small Island Developing State Perspective, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk eds., 2013).
5 Friedman, supra note 52 ("'Were it not for the fact that they are so dependent on
foreign aid, I think they would have brought claims ten years ago. I know this for a fact,'
said Matt Pawa, an attorney who represented the Alaskan village of Kivalina in a landmark
global warming case.").
60 Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, supra note 56.
61 Id.
62 See Phoenix X.F. Cai, Making WTO Remedies Work for Developing Nations: The
Need for Class Actions, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 151, 155-56 (2011). Developing nations
may "fear the possibility of unilateral retaliation by the United States, either through a
decrease in development or military aid or by revoking access to the Generalized System of
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persistent capacity and power differential in the climate context, and other
areas in which it influences international law, threatens to compromise
confidence in international law's ability to promote and defend legal
rights.63 Indeed, one scholar has questioned if international law is able to
provide effective legal mechanisms to protect sovereign interests when
other states control the unyielding emissions that accelerate climate
change.64 If international law cannot do this for the most vulnerable, it does
not bode well for SIDS for which the international legal regime is an
indispensable piece of their efforts to halt dangerous climate change.
IV. SURVEY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION CLAIMS
There have been several calls for climate-related litigation, often with a
focus on claims brought by or in the interest of most vulnerable. 65 The
defendant contemplated is almost always the United States, the single
Preferences, which grants them preferential trade terms as developing nations." Id. at 180.
Cai identifies two additional reasons: (i) "lack of market share and ability to affect world
markets"; and (ii) "asymmetries or unevenness in the effectiveness of remedies." Id. at 156
(citation omitted). But see Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and
Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes,
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (2005) (finding that although capacity constraints may limit the
number of cases developing countries are able to pursue, political hurdles, such as fear of
retaliation by the would-be defendant are less supported). Although the study is useful
overall, Guzman and Simmons' methodology is not directly useful for the parallel I wish to
draw here. Among several other reasons, Guzman and Simmons' article has limited
relevance (i) because of their choice of defendants on whom they focus their study and (ii)
because they do not isolate the particularly resource- and power- constrained SIDS I am
concerned with here. Nevertheless, the authors admit, "Although our results fail to support
the power hypothesis, we cannot rule out the possibility that power plays an important role
in determining the number of cases filed." Id. at 571.
63 On this point, see Professor Badrinarayana's trenchant argument in, Deepa
Badrinarayana, Global Warming: A Second Coming for International Law, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 253 (2010). Badrinarayna's articles examines "why international law does not provide
adequate redress to about eighty percent of the world's population whose lives and property
are threatened by climate change, and whose governments may thus effectively be denied
sovereign control over their domestic affairs." Id. at 254. She attributes "the inadequacy of
international law in the climate context to the evolution of the international community into
an economic union that has historically privileged material interests over legal rights." Id. at
253. Ultimately she argues that "state behavior in the context of climate change is currently
consistent with historic international legal responses to rights violations generally, and thus,
mitigating violations of sovereignty will require new approaches in international law." Id. at
255. Although she offers valuable tools to conceive of new approaches, crafting these new
approaches is left largely to others.
6 See id at 254
65 Brown, supra note 5.
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largest historical emitter and the second greatest current emitter.6 They
also explicitly or tacitly admit the Framework Convention's failure to
address failed mitigation efforts or the possibility of climate-related damage
that is too great for adaptation provisions to address.67 This section briefly
describes the four most commonly recommended claims and legal avenues:
(1) human rights claims and tribunals; (2) alien tort claims in United States
district courts; (3) violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea in several fora; and (4) violations of treaties, breaches of
customary international law or requests for an advisory opinion in the ICJ.68
It does not delve into some of the substantive issues, such as establishing a
causal link between a nation's emissions and climate impacts, which might
impede the merits phase of the action.
A. Appealing to Human Rights
Climate change directly and indirectly implicates well-recognized human
rights obligations. Consideration of these obligations is particularly
useful for vulnerable populations as it connects the many dangerous climate
impacts to the human rights commitments states have already undertaken.
In addition, it helps to demonstrate the extent of the harm suffered as a
result of the rights violation. 70 Life-threatening extreme weather events, for
example, directly impact rights to life, dignity, and personal security-core
66 Clark, supra note 5.
67 See, e.g., Roda Verheyen & Peter Roderick, Beyond Adaptation: The Legal Duty to
Pay Compensation for Climate Change Damage, WWF-UK Climate Change Programme
Discussion Paper, Nov. 2008, at 6, 13, available at http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/
beyond adaptation lowres.pdf.
68 For a more comprehensive discussion of legal rights and remedies with respect to
climate change adaptation, see Maxine Burkett, Legal Rights and Remedies, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 815
(Michael Gerrard & Katrina Kuh, eds., 2012). There are other possible international fora
that scholars have considered that are not discussed here, including the World Trade
Organization, the World Heritage Committee, and the Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement.
See generally ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES (William C. G. Bums & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
69 See generally U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion And Protection OfAll Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The Right To
Development, A/HRC/10/24 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.refworld.org/
docid/49a5223b2.html; see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Climate
Change, A/HRC/10/L.30 (Mar. 20, 2009), available at http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/GO9/124/08/pdf/GO912408.pdf?OpenElement.
70 Megan Chapman, Climate Change and the Regional Human Rights Systems, 10
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 37, 37 (2010) (citing U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution
7/23 (Mar. 28, 2008)).
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civil and political rights.71  Decreased rainfall resulting in increasing
drought and desertification threatens the ability to produce food, thus
implicating the recognized right to food.72 Some less direct human rights
obligations involve the plight of climate-induced migrants, for whom the
right to privacy and family life has been compromised.73 Other rights
implicated include: the rights to the highest attainable standard of health,
adequate housing, and self-determination as well as human rights
obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation.74
Some rights are given greater deference than others. Courts tend to find
civil and political rights, like the right to life and security, enforceable more
so than their economic, social, and cultural counterparts. In fact, many of
the rights that climate change affects fall into the latter category in which
the link between the right and the corresponding duty is blurred.76
Nonetheless, these claims may still have traction, evidenced by their
progress in regional human rights tribunals. Where pollution prevented
people from living in their homes, for example, the European Court of
Human Rights has found that the right to privacy and family life was
violated.77 Further, a more general right to a healthy environment is
emerging at the international, regional, and national level.
n See Amy Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The
Case Against Gas Flaring in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 173, 185 (William C. G. Burns & Hari M.
Osofsky eds., 2009).
72 Graham Frederick Dumas, A Greener Revolution: Using the Right to Food as a
Political Weapon Against Climate Change, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 107 (2010) (citing
Article 11 (1) and (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights).
7 Sinden, supra note 71, at 185 (arguing that if sea-level rise displaces people from their
homes even without physical injury, the right to privacy and family life might well be
violated). Sinden also suggests a violation of the right to information that is "increasingly
viewed as derivative of long-standing and fundamental civil and political rights to freedom
of expression." Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
74 U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion And Protection Of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The Right To Development,
supra note 69; see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Climate Change,
supra note 69.
7s Sinden, supra note 71, at 182. See also, Wolfgang Sachs, Climate Change and
Human Rights, 106 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL CHANGE AND HuM. HEALTH 349 (
2006).
76 Sachs, supra note 75, at 349.
n Sinden, supra note 71, at 187. See International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976
[hereinafter ICCPR]. ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence. . . .").
7 See Chapman, supra note 70; Reed, supra note 50, at 413-14. The African Charter on
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To date, the LACHR is the only regional human rights body that has
heard a claim of violation of rights because of climate change. 9 Relying on
the rights laid out in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, the Inuit peoples of Alaska and Canada brought an action against the
United States in 2005.so Petitioners alleged adverse impacts resulting from
U.S. emissions that threatened the enjoyment of numerous human rights-
including the rights to preservation of life, security, means of subsistence,
and to residence and inviolability of home.8 ' The IACHR dismissed the
Petition without prejudice in 2006 finding insufficient information to
determine that the alleged facts characterized a violation of rights the
American Declaration protects. 82 In 2007, however, the IACHR invited the
petitioners, at their request, to a broader hearing to discuss the nexus
between climate change and human rights. A decision from the IACHR
is, in all likelihood, not forthcoming. The most notable challenge to the
claim was that the United States has not accepted the jurisdiction of the
IACHR.
Lack of jurisdiction of human rights treaties over the most significant
emitters is common. Even if there is jurisdiction, an IACHR decision
declaring human rights violations resulting from the impacts of
anthropogenic climate change is not enforceable.84 Its value is in the
declaration's ancillary effects. Those seeking compensation in a domestic
action due to climate-related injuries, for example, could use a statement on
climate change and human rights from a relevant tribunal as persuasive
authority in domestic courts.
Human and Peoples' Rights, for example, explicitly recognizes right to environment.
Chapman, supra note 73, at 37. Further, the African Commission on Human and Peoples
Rights has found violations of this right. Id.
79 See Burkett, supra note 68.
80 See Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United
States (submitted Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/
legaldocs/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-
inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf.
81 Svitlana Kravchenko, Right To Carbon Or Right To Life: Human Rights Approaches
to Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 513, 523, 528 (2008).
82 Id. at 535.
83 For a general discussion of the procedural history and substantive claims of the Inuit
Petition, see Osofsky, supra note 45, and Kravchenko, supra note 81, at 534-36.
4 See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights arts. 1-2, Oct. 31,
1979, O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (IX-o/79), available at http://www.iachr.org/Basicos/basic
15.htm [hereinafter A TS]. Only the IACHR can generate enforceable decisions and it too
lacks jurisdiction over the U.S. Id.
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Although the general theories at base usually concern human rights
norms, other international norms might be relevant.85 The transboundary
harm rule, which requires states to prevent or minimize the risk of damage
to other states, and state responsibility, which holds an offending state
responsible for the cost of preventing damage and addressing "unavoided"
damage, 87 are foundational for claims seeking rapid emissions reduction
and compensation for loss and damage small islands suffer. SIDS might
bring a claim based on the breach of this kind of customary international
law in U.S. domestic courts via the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), or, perhaps,
in the ICJ.
B. Possible Claims Under the Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute" ("ATS") was enacted in 1789 to allow foreign
persons to sue defendants in U.S. courts for violations of international
law.89  The ATS states simply: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."90 A
claimant must meet the following requirements to bring a claim under the
ATS: (i) an alien must bring suit; (ii) the claim must be in tort; and, (iii) the
85 The Rio Declaration contains one of several articulations of the norm: "States shall . .
cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international
law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction."
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (emphasis
added).
86 For a discussion of the possible revival of transboundary harm through an advisory
opinion on climate change impacts, see Korman & Barcia, supra note 30, at 40. For a
comprehensive discussion of the transboundary harm principle and its possible role in
litigation under the ATS, see Ajmel Quereshi, The Search for an Environmental Filartiga:
Trans-Boundary Harm and the Future of International Environmental Litigation, 56 How.
L.J. 131, 168 (2012).
87 Verheyen & Roderick, supra note 67, at 6, 15-18. State responsibility as well as the
polluter pays principle are ostensibly reflected in the Framework Convention, "which notes
that the largest share of historical and current global emissions has originated in developed
countries." Slade, supra note 31, at 541.
88 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007). For a general discussion of the ATS and its relevance to
climate change and other environmental claims, see Ajmel Quereshi, supra note 86. See
also Reed, supra note 50.
89 See Burkett, supra note 68.
90 See ATS, supra note 84.
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tort must be a violation of the law of nations.91 Jurisdiction extends beyond
the governments of foreign nationals to include private parties.9 2
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,93 the Supreme Court recognized the
propriety of the district courts to "recognize private causes of action for
certain torts in violation of the law of nations," 94 including human rights-
based litigation. The scope of claims is limited, however, by those "norms
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features" at the time the ATS was originally
enacted. In other words, the Court limited claims of international law
violations to those recognized in the 18th century. It is not clear if courts
would deem human rights claims based on anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions as tantamount to, say, torture and genocide.95
Some have argued that the ATS may indeed serve as a powerful tool to
address environmental harms generally and climate change specifically.96
It is important to note, however, that to date courts have generally
dismissed "environmental ATS" cases due to diverse substantive and
procedural issues.97 Nonetheless, there is persuasive literature that suggests
that the ATS might be an important part of a bundle of claims that
claimants could bring at the international and domestic scales. Possible
claims would be based on human rights actions98 or based on the rule of no
transboundary harm, with the latter obligation argued as well-established
customary international law. 99 There are significant substantive limitations
9 For further discussion, see Reed, supra note 50, at 423.
92 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), and discussion by Richard 0.
Faulk, The Expanding Use of the Alien Torts Act in International Human Rights
Enforcement, in CLASS ACTION LiIGATION REPORT, 10 TXLR 294 (2009) available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 023&context-richard faulk.
93 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
94 Id at 744.
9 Perhaps telling, the Sosa Court expressed doubt as to the utility of the ICCPR for
setting actionable international law norms for the purposes of the ATS. Id. at 692; see also
Faulk, supra note 92.
96 See generally, Quereshi, supra note 86; Reed, supra note 50 (seeking to show that
environmental human rights do exist and that a violation of these rights is a violation of
international law, and therefore remediable under the ATCA).
9 Quereshi, supra note 86, at 133, 152 (summarizing the three grounds on which courts
have consistently criticized environmental norms).
98 Reed, supra note 50, at 407 (arguing that "[b]ecause no case arguing a violation of
international environmental law has been successful under the ATCA, the Pacific Island
nations may be more successful arguing a violation of environmental human rights. As
other human rights claims have been successful, tying an environment protection claim to a
human rights claim might have the greatest chance of success.") (citations omitted).
9 See Quereshi, supra note 86, at 132-33. Quereshi argues: "The hesitancy of
American courts to recognize a viable environmental claim under the ATS results in part
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to these claims, namely that individuals are not understood as the rights
bearers in the transboundary harm cases and, similarly though conversely,
individual entities are not deemed the duty bearers in the human rights
context.100 There may be relevant legal arguments that can soften some of
these limitations,'to however, they are beyond the scope of the current
discussion. 10 2
A more hopeful possibility is the continued evolution of international law
norms, an evolution that might soon empower small island litigants in U.S.
domestic courts. Since the enactment of the ATS, jurists were concerned
with whether the norm asserted by the claimant was "ripe"-in other words,
whether the norm "had achieved sufficient status to be part of the 'law of
from the failure of international litigators to file and sufficiently support a claim alleging a
violation of the most viable international environmental norm-the prohibition on trans-
boundary harm." Id. at 133. Quereshi admits, however, that a major hurdle to pursuing a
claim on the basis of transboundary harm is "unlike a number of norms in the human rights
context, the prohibition against trans-boundary harm is generally understood as creating a
duty between states, not individuals." Id. at 133-34. As discussed infra note 102, ATS
claims against states suffer a number of significant jurisdictional hurdles.
100 Quereshi, supra note 86, at 165; see also Reed, supra note 50, at 421-22.
Reed explains:
Because judicial interpretation of the ATCA has not yet included human rights
violations as one of the harms that does not require a state action, the nations will have
to make a claim that greenhouse gas emission by corporations in the United States is
done under color of state law. Such a claim is daunting, but not insurmountable ....
[M]ajor corporations in coal, oil, gas, and energy production industries do extensive
lobbying of Congress. . . . [A] combination of creation and implementation of state
policy could potentially satisfy the state actor test.
Id.
101 See discussion of the §1983's color of law doctrine in Quereshi, supra note 86, at 164.
102 Whether jurisdiction extends to multinational corporations, who as a group are a
significant source of global greenhouse gas emissions, is also up for determination. Recent
appellate court decisions have done little to clarify this point. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3 111 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit held that ATS jurisdiction
does not extend to claims against corporate defendants. Id. Coming to the polar opposite
conclusion, however, the D.C. Circuit held in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) that corporations are not immune from liability under the ATS. Id. The circuit
split leaves this question open, along with several other questions the Supreme Court's Sosa
decision left unresolved. In late 2011, the Supreme Court agreed to review Kiobel and
decide whether claimants can sue oil companies and other multinationals for alleged human
rights abuses overseas. Burkett, supra note 68, at 823. At oral arguments the Court ordered
new oral arguments directing the parties to brief and argue a third question: "Whether and
under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory
of a sovereign other than the United States." Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be Expanded and
Reargued, SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=140230
(quotation marks omitted).
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nations."' 0 3 Centuries later, courts can look at the non-static norms of
international law to identify the enforceable norm under the ATS.'04  In
other words, courts have "embraced [the law of nations] as dynamic and
changing as the international community recognizes new rights and
duties."'0 5 Some scholars argue, therefore, that an expanded embrace will
include key environmental rights and duties, if it has not already.
If the Court resolves questions regarding possible climate-related claims
and defendants in favor of a more expansive view, it is plausible that
plaintiffs can pursue claims for damages relief against large emitters in
federal district courts. In the near-term, however, the lack of clarity with
respect to proper jurisdiction makes ATS a less favorable avenue through
which to seek remedy.
C. Claims Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea
The dispute resolution mechanism under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea' 06 ("UNCLOS") may provide a viable avenue for a
binding decision in favor of the most vulnerable island nations.' 07
Commonly referred to as "a constitution for the oceans," UNCLOS entered
into force in 1948 and currently has 165 parties. 08 Unsurprisingly, small
island states, many with extensive ocean resources, were heavily engaged in
the development of the Convention.'09 UNCLOS may be a promising
instrument for advancing climate change litigation due to its expansive
definition of pollution, the clear obligations on State parties to preserve the
health of the environment, and the availability of voluntary and compulsory
103 Quereshi, supra note 86, at 135.
104 See Reed, supra note 50, at 406.
105 Id.
106 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.A/Conf.62/121, 21
I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
107 See generally William C.G. Bums, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change
Damages in International Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention, 2 INT'L J. SUST. DEv. L.
&POL'Y, no. 1 (2006), at 27-51 (arguing that UNCLOS may prove to be one of the primary
battlegrounds for climate change issues in the future); Jacobs, supra note 39, at 115 (2005)
(arguing, inter alia, that "[d]ispute resolution under the Law of the Sea Convention may be
Tuvalu's most successful avenue for redress, especially if Tuvalu desires a binding decision
by the ICJ.").
108 Chronological Lists ofRatifications of Accessions and Successions to the Convention
and the Related Agreements as of 23 January 2013, U.N. DISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS &
THE LAW OF THE SEA, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/referencefiles/chronological lists-of
ratifications.htm (last visited April 26, 2013).
109 See Slade, supra note 31, at 534-35 (describing, inter alia, small island states' active
participation in the work of the U.N. Seabed Committee and the Third U.N. Conference on
the Law of the Sea, shaping the development of exclusive economic zones).
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dispute resolution mechanisms to press claims related to environmental
pollution. 0 Notably, however, the United States is not a State party.1 "
UNCLOS expansively imposes obligations on State parties regarding the
prevention and reduction of pollution. It defines pollution such that an
arbiter could conclude that carbon dioxide is a pollutant that State parties
are obliged to limit.112 In the context of climate change impacts, respondent
states could be the small group of states that are both parties to UNCLOS
and major emitting developed countries." 3 The remedies an affected state
could pursue range from an order to perform impact assessments of
greenhouse gas emitting projectsll 4 to monetary damages for the costs
carbon pollution imposes on the coastal state, including the costs of
adaptation and building defenses as well as the value of lost land area,
coastal resources, and sovereignty. Additional remedies might include
cooperation on the initiation of international negotiations on ocean
acidification or displaced persons, for example.
UNCLOS recognizes the sovereign right of states to exploit their natural
resources, but the use of their resources must be in accordance with "their
duty to protect and preserve the marine environment."" 5 Specifically, State
parties are required to "prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source.""'16 That obligation includes avoiding "the
release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those that are
persistent . . . from land-based sources, [or] from or through the
atmosphere.""'7  In addition, State parties must "take 'all measures
110 See generally, Burns, supra note 107; see also Chris Wold, David Hunter & Melissa
Powers, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAw,412-26 (2009).
11 This may not be dispositive of related claims against the U.S., see discussion infra
Part IV.D, and it may change shortly. See also Allison Winter, Sen. Kerry Sees Prospects to
Advance Law of the Sea, ENvT. & ENERGY DAILY (July 20, 2011), http://www.eenews.
net/EEDaily/2011/07/20/6. Ironically, the melting Arctic ice has inspired renewed interest
in the region with its new shipping lanes and areas of potential oil and gas exploration. Id.
To participate in the international governance regime, it would behoove the United States to
ratify UNCLOS. Id.
112 See UNCLOS, supra note 106, art. 1, para. 4 ("'[P]ollution of the marine
environment' means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health,
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea,
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.").
113 For the legal elements of an UNCLOS claim, see Burkett, supra note 68.
14 See UNCLOS, supra note 106, art. 206.
11 Id. art. 193.
"' Id. art. 194, para.1.
"1 Id. art. 194, para. 3(a); Id. art. 207 (requiring states to "adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources,
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necessary' to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction [] are so
conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment [.]""8 Further, parties must take measures to "protect and
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life." 19
UNCLOS obligations are not absolute. The "protect and preserve"
mandate is not a total prohibition against pollution but has been interpreted
instead as a due diligence obligation.120  Nevertheless, UNCLOS might
effectively address the adverse effects of climate change.
Particularly relevant to international obligations vis-a-vis climate change
under the Framework Convention, Article 212 requires parties to take into
account international mechanisms to control pollution and take into account
"internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedure." 1 21 In addition, parties must cooperate through "competent
international organization" to formulate, rules, standards, and practices to
protect and preserve the marine environment, under Article 197. A State's
failure to fulfill these obligations under UNCLOS triggers liability, which
might include "assessment of and compensation for damage," among other
things. 12 2 Article 235 states that, "States are responsible for the fulfillment
of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation
of the marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance with
international law."1 2 3 A State party to the UNFCCC, for example, may face
liability claims pursuant to Article 235.124 The extent of liability that
including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall sources"; "take other measures as may be
necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution"; and "endeavor to establish global
and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce,
and control pollution of marine environment from land-based sources, taking into account
characteristic regional features, economic capacity of developing states and their need for
economic development"); Id. art. 212, para. I ("States shall adopt laws and regulations to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or through the
atmosphere. . . .").
118 Bums, supra note 107, at 37-38 (citation omitted); see UNCLOS, supra note 106, art.
194, para. 2.
"1 UNCLOS, supra note 106, art. 194, para. 5.
120 Bums, supra note 107, at 46.
121 UNCLOS, supra note 106, art. 212, para. 1.
122 Id. art. 235, para. 3. It also provides:
States shall cooperate in the implementation of existing international law and the
further development of international law relating to responsibility and liability for the
assessment of and compensation for damage and the settlement of related disputes, as
well as, where appropriate, development of criteria and procedures for payment of
adequate compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds.
123 Id. art. 235, para. 1.
124 For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between UNCLOS and the
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extends from obligations under UNFCCC is subject to interpretation.12 5
Nevertheless, a party to UNCLOS could argue that a State party has not met
its UNFCCC obligations and is liable for damages under Articles 235 and
197 of UNCLOS.12 6
One of the major barriers to effective use of the UNCLOS dispute
settlement regime is that the United States, a major historical emitter, is not
a party to the Convention. Whereas the U.S. has accepted the major
provisions of UNCLOS as customary international law, to which it must
comply, it has not accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ for resolving disputes
over customary law violations.'2 7 In other words, although the U.S. is not
subject to the dispute settlement mechanisms of UNCLOS, a complaining
party could arguably press claims under violations of customary law due to
the impact of its emissions on marine health. The complaining party could
not bring that claim to the ICJ, however, as the U.S. withdrew its
acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction.12 8
D. The International Court ofJustice and the
Promise of an Advisory Opinion
1. The International Court ofJustice and Climate Change
To press climate adaptation claims against another State, countries can
bring suit in the ICJ.129 The ICJ has two primary adjudicative functions.
One is to resolve international law disputes between sovereign states.13 0
The other is to issue advisory opinions on outstanding legal questions at the
request of the General Assembly.'3' Again, it is important to note,
UNFCCC, see Bums, supra note 107, at 46-49.
125 See id.
126 Parties would press their claims in one of several arenas. Part XV of UNCLOS
provides states with four possible venues for dispute settlement. UNCLOS, supra note 106,
art. 287, para. 1. An affected state can bring a claim under UNCLOS to (i) the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); (ii) the International Court of Justice (ICJ); (iii) an
arbitral panel; or, (iv) a special arbitral panel. Id. States may declare a choice of forum. Id.
If they have not, or where parties to the dispute have not accepted the same procedures for
dispute settlement, the dispute is submitted to binding arbitration unless the parties agree
otherwise. Id. art. 280, para. 5.
127 See Bums, supra note 107, at 45.
128 Id. 45.
129 See Burkett, supra note 68.
130 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTERIV [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see also
Korman & Barcia, supra note 30, at 38.
131 ICJ Statute, supra note 130.
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however, that the United States does not recognize the jurisdiction of the
ICJ.132 Further, the jurisdiction of the ICJ is limited to State complaints
against other states, and not private parties. 133 In addition, there is no
formal mechanism to enforce judgments of the Court.13 4  Nonetheless,
Tuvalu threatened to sue the United States in the ICJ.' 5 Moreover, Palau's
call for an advisory opinion has excited many and inspired this renewed
consideration of the efficacy of litigation for SIDS.'3 6
Low-emitting, high impact countries, like SIDS, are the most obvious
applicant countries to press claims before the ICJ.'3 7 The ICJ can exercise
jurisdiction over the parties (i) by mutual agreement; (ii) through the
"coincident existence" of applicant and respondent parties who had
accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ;13 8 or, (iii) through an
independent treaty's dispute resolution clause specifying settlement before
the ICJ."' If the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over one or both of the
parties, a country can seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ through the
General Assembly.14 0
In reviewing substantive claims presented before it, the JCJ can look to
several sources of law. The Court would look to other special treaties, such
as the UNFCCC, customary international law, and general principles of
132 See The United States and the ICJ, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Dec. 27, 2011)
http://www.cfr.org/intemational-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/united-states-icj/p26905.
133 See Contentious Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ijc-cij.org,
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1 (last visited April 26, 2013).
134 See Advisory Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ijc-cij.org,
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1 (last visited April 26, 2013).
135 See generally Jacobs, supra note 39.
136 See Palau Seeks UN World Court Opinion on Damage Caused by Greenhouse Gases,
UN NEWS CENTER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=39710
&Cr=pacific+island&Crl#.UXsosuDEOyE [hereinafter Palau Seeks UN World Court
Opinion].
137 In fact, Tuvalu threatened to bring a claim against the United States before the ICJ.
Andrew Strauss, Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the International Court of
Justice, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES 334 (William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009). For a thorough
discussion on the viability of such a claim, as well as the formidable hurdles it would face,
see Jacobs, supra note 39.
138 See generally Strauss, supra note 137, at 338-348.
139 See generally id at 345. Strauss identifies additional procedural and substantive
issues that might bar claims before the ICJ.
140 ICJ Statute, supra note 130, art. 65. In September 2011, the Pacific Island nations of
Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands announced plans to seek an advisory opinion
on whether countries have a legal responsibility to ensure that greenhouse gas emitting
activities on their territory do not pose harm to other States. Palau seeks UN World Court
Opinion, supra note 136.
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international law.141 The UNFCCC would be a logical starting point,142 as
treaties are the most authoritative source of international law. Although
provisions of the Framework Convention are relevant, the ICJ would not be
inclined to intervene in an ongoing, international negotiations process. At
best the Court would only intervene if the complaining party could
demonstrate that at least some parties are not negotiating in good faith.143
For example, a small island state might press the ICJ directly arguing the
absence of good faith based on a failure to meet emissions-reduction and
adaptation assistance obligations set out in the Framework Convention and
Kyoto Protocol.
An applicant country might also advance claims based on customary
international law and general principles of law, such as the law on state
responsibility for transboundary harm discussed briefly in Part IV.A. The
principle for liability based on extraterritorial harm is drawn from the most
basic legal precept that arbiters should hold legal actors responsible for the
harm they do to others.'" There is precedent for finding State liability
based on transboundary harm that might assist a complaining State
suffering from the impacts of sea-level rise, for example, to seek aggressive
mitigation and compensation from high-emitting states. 14 5
If the ICJ is able to adjudicate a claim, it could yield significant
advantages.146  For example, a favorable ruling could make for a more
rigorous post-Kyoto regime, as affected states could enjoy the normative
higher ground in negotiations. An adverse finding against a powerful
country, however, could be quite difficult to enforce.
2. The promise ofPalau's advisory opinion
Since September 2011, with the request by its President to the UN
General Assembly, Palau has sought "on an urgent basis . . . an advisory
opinion from the ICJ on the responsibilities of States under international
law to ensure that activities carried out under their jurisdiction or control
141 See generally Strauss, supra note 137, at 350.
142 For discussion of claims that the Republic of Marshall Islands might bring before the
ICJ, see J. Chris Larson, Racing the Rising Tide: Legal Options for the Marshall Islands, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 495 (2000).
143 Joyeeta Gupta, Legal Steps Outside the Climate Convention: Litigation as a Tool to
Address Climate Change, 16 REv. OF EUROPEAN COMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L., 1 76, 78 (2007),
available at http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/31866/208178.pdfsequence=1.
144 See Strauss, supra note 137, at 350-52.
145 See id. at 352 (discussing the Trail Smelter arbitration).
146 Id. at 339.
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that emit greenhouse gases do not damage other States." 47 Palau's hope,
shared by numerous commentators, is that an advisory opinion will close
the "rhetorical gap" between state action and international legal
responsibilities.14 8
Consistent with the UN Charter, the ICJ can issue advisory opinions
presented by the General Assembly,14 9 regardless of its political nature or
the absence of discrete parties before it.'50 Further, although not binding
law, advisory opinions nevertheless have authority as statements of law.'s'
So, although the U.S. does not accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, an
advisory opinion may hold important symbolic weight.'52 Citing impactful
opinions issued in the Nuclear Weapons Cases and in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, among others, Bavishi and Barakat argue: "Although
advisory opinions are not legally binding, the findings contained in them
147 Raj Bavishi & Subhi Barakat, Procedural Issues Related to the ICJ's Advisory
Jurisdiction, Briefing Paper, LEGAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE (June 11, 2012), available at
http://www.1egalresponseinitiative.org/download/BP41 E%20-%20Briefing/o20Paper/o20-
%20The%201CJ%20Advisory/o200pinion%2OProcedure%20(11%2OJune%202012).pdf.
148 Korman & Barcia, supra note 30, at 38.
149 See U.N. Charter, art. 96, para. I ("The General Assembly or the Security Council
may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal
question."). See ICJ Statute, supra note 130, art. 65 ("The Court may give an advisory
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request."); Bavishi &
Barakat, supra note 147, at 1 ("The General Assembly, the Security Council and UN organs
and agencies authorized by the General Assembly can request an advisory opinion on 'legal
questions arising within their scope of activities."'). For a comprehensive discussion of the
process and substance of ICJ advisory opinions, see Bavishi & Barakat, supra note 147. See
also Korman & Barcia, supra note 30, at 38. The ICJ has issued twenty-six advisory
opinions, with the 1996 Nuclear Weapons case widely deemed the most relevant to the
current climate change cases. Id. at 39.
150 See Bavishi & Barakat, supra note 147, at 7. Regarding the political nature of a
question, Bavishi and Barakat state:
Contentions about the political nature of a question have been raised to argue against
the propriety of the ICJ giving an advisory opinion. Where a question contains a
political dimension, the ICJ, to date, has taken a flexible approach and taken care to
identify and address only the legal elements of a question which invite it to "discharge
an essentially judicial task." A request for an advisory opinion is therefore valid and
the ICJ has jurisdiction to provide an advisory opinion even in situations in which
political considerations are prominent, provided that the question asked is a legal one.
Id. (citations omitted).
' See MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 111 (2003), ("the [ICJ's]
opinions, in practice, have the same value as [] judgments because they are
'pronouncements' ruled by the Court regarding the applicable law in specific issues.").
152 Jacobs, supra note 39, at 117 (explaining that the advisory opinion may be one way
for the ICJ to gain jurisdiction over the U.S. to the benefit of SIDS).
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carry great legal weight and moral authority. They contain the World
Court's view on important issues of international law and contribute to the
elucidation and development of international law." Korman and Barcia
go one step further and argue that an advisory opinion on climate change
would not only have historic value but would "have the power to reshape
positively the international approach to greenhouse gas emissions."' 54
It could, among other things, clearly establish an international norm
against transboundary harm caused by these emissions. A clear definition of
states' obligations and responsibilities would come at an "opportune time,"
which, at the time of Korman and Barcia's publication was at the desired
commencement of a new international agreement binding all countries at
the most recent UNFCCC conference of the parties.'55  Although that
moment may have unceremoniously passed, with the waning faith in and
enthusiasm for the UNFCCC process, another moment may have emerged
with the Obama Administration's recent statements regarding climate
action.156
V. WEIGHING AID AND EXTINCTION
The existence of a justice paradox in the climate change context is
perhaps unsurprising when set against the backdrop of other international
law dynamics. Power disparities in the international community are
arguably inherent in the conception and structure of current international
organization,157 with the Security Council serving as a paragon of the
imbalance. The paradox is most striking in this instance, however, because
the stakes for SIDS are unusually high, completely unprecedented, and
likely irreversible in terms of the nature and scope of the impacts.
The prognosis for atoll nations like the Maldives, Tuvalu, and Kiribati is
that they will lose all of their territory, a loss that significantly dwarfs the
aid numbers that some countries currently fear losing. In fact, a comparison
of the annual aid dollars that the U.S. gives to the Maldives versus the cost
of certain adaptations or the loss of GDP due to the total loss of territory
demonstrates the uneven impacts of climate change. 58 Indeed, a survey of
153 Bavishi & Barakat, supra note 147, at 2.
154 Korman & Barcia, supra note 30, at 36.
' Id. at 38.
156 See discussion infra Part V.C.
157 See generally Badrinarayana, supra note 63.
158 The U.S. plans to give between two to three million dollars to the Maldives.
Maldives, FOREIGNASSISTANCE.GOV, http://www.foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?FY=2013
&OUID=307&AgencylD=0&budTab-tabBudPlanned; see also Hassan H. Shihab, First
Sec'y of the Permanent Mission of the Maldives to the U.N., Statement to the Chairperson at
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aid numbers across similarly situated SIDS reveals the same imbalance. 15 9
Some countries appreciate this imbalance and are fearless in the face of
it.160 Palau Ambassador to the United Nations, Stuart Beck, acknowledges
the United States' objections and maintains that Palau "'gives far more in
strategic value' to the United States than it takes in assistance."l 61
Although the general fear of retaliation may be warranted today, the
calamity that some of these nations face requires creativity and courage in
pursuing the claims summarized in Part IV, and perhaps a few other legal
and political approaches that might yield results.1 62 This section explores
the possibility of pursuing second-tier defendants, identifying representative
parties or class action litigation to bring claims, and the value of litigation
generally in moving the legal and political needle.
the General Debate of the Second Committee, (Oct. 8, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/second/67/maldives8oct.pdf ("Maldives is doing whatever it can to
build its resilience to combat the effects of climate change. The Government of Maldives is
currently spending more than 27% of its national budget for this purpose.").
159 For a comparison of aid numbers, see generally AIDFLOws, http://www.aidflows.org
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013). The United States has a unique relationship to the freely
associated island nations. Additional cash flows go to the Republic of Marshall Islands, the
Federal States of Micronesia, and Palau from the United States, beyond the aid numbers
given through aid agencies. See Francis X. Hezel, S.J., Pacific Island Nations: How Viable
Are Their Economies?, 7 PAC. ISLAND POL'Y 1, 21-23 (2012), available at
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/pipOO7_0.pdf Although this may
shift the balance slightly, acting in response to the cost of climate impacts is still preferred.
Id. at 3-4.
160 See Friedman, supra note 52 (citing Seychelles Ambassador to the United Nations,
Ronald Jumeau, referring to the United States: "'We just don't trust you anymore. And
we've waited long enough. In fact, we've waited until your own country has been hit by the
worst drought in [sixty] years, until your people are squealing like us. How much more can
we wait?' . . . He added that parties pressing the ICJ case have been careful not to name any
specific country and have willingly watered down the resolution to attract European
support.").
161 id.
162 The author does not wish to understate the difficulty of pursuing these claims for
SIDS. The benefits, however, would be great if realized. Carroll Muffett, President of the
Center for International Environmental Law, is confident that eventually the law will force
changes where treaty negotiations have not. See id. He explains:
It's not easy, but once you open that door, if some clever attorney and some brave
plaintiff somewhere can open that door, it changes the entire calculus . . . There are a
lot of levers out there that haven't been pulled yet. When they're pulled, it's going to
move the world in exciting ways. But finding a country that has the capacity and the
will and the immune system for this stuff is tough.
Id.
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A. Second-Tier Defendants
One way to sidestep concerns of reprisal from major economic powers163
is to look to the actions of other significant sources of emissions from
countries on which SIDS are less dependent. In this "thousand cuts"
approach, SIDS can seek to limit the current unabated emissions from other
high emitters that provide little if any aid, and at the same time deter other
similarly situated countries from continuing or expanding its use of fossil
fuel resources, for example.'64 The Federated States of Micronesia modeled
this approach in its novel challenge to the Czech upgrade of the Prunerov
power plant.16 5
Though ultimately unsuccessful, the claim brought against the Czech
Republic arguing transboundary impacts under the 1991 Espoo
Convention 6 6 put governments and corporations "on notice." 67 With the
upgrade, the power plant is among the highest greenhouse gas emitting
plants in Europe.16 8 Micronesia requested inclusion in the transboundary
environmental impact assessment prior to project commencement, a request
that delayed but did not halt the upgrade.169  Nonetheless, Micronesia's
approach was considered "precedent-setting." Indeed, it provides a skeletal
163 For example, according to Seychelles Ambassador to the United Nations Ronald
Jumeau, China and the United States appear to be "terrified" that the request for an advisory
opinion will move forward. Id.
'6 See id.
165 See generally Robert Maketo et al., Transboundary Climate Challenge to Coal: One
Small Step against Dirty Energy, One Giant Leap for Climate Justice, in THREATENED
ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 589
(Michael Gerrard & Gregory Wannier, eds., 2013); Eva Munk, Czech Ministry Accepts
Micronesian Input In Assessing Impact ofPower Plant Upgrade, DAILY ENvT. RPT. (Jan. 25,
2010).
166 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Sept.
10, 1997, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309, available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eial
documents/legaltexts/conventiontextenglish.pdf. The convention gives States that signed the
right to enter impacts assessments in other member states. Id. arts. 3-5. Micronesia is not a
signatory, whereas the Czech Republic is a party. See Status of Ratification, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XXV
II-4&chapter-27&lang-en (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
167 Czech Ministry Accepts Micronesian Input In Assessing Impact of Power Plant
Upgrade, supra note 165 (Jan Rovensky of Czech branch of Greenpeace stated: "In a
broader context, the current case should put governments and corporations in developed
countries on notice that states vulnerable to climate change are keen to explore new avenues
to challenge decision on projects that contribute to climate change.").
16s Id.
169 See Gabriella Hold, PRUNtAOV EXPANSION APPRovED, THE PRAGUE POST (May 5,
2010), http://www.praguepost.com/news/4331-prunerov-expansion-approved.html.
661
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 35:633
roadmap of how to explore and employ similar provisions to pursue actions
against significant yet "second-tier" emitters.
B. Representative Parties and Class Action Litigation
Another approach that utilizes existing laws in novel ways would be to
rethink the plaintiffs that bring these claims. Representative parties who
will suffer significant impacts and are large in number across disparate
communities could make the greatest strides. Similarly, countries might act
in concert to deflect some of the specific scrutiny a single country might
face if it brings claims on its own. These actions might advance efforts that
could aid the most vulnerable small island states.
Representative parties that suffer similar impacts from across a particular
region might serve as compelling claimants in an action against large
emitters or "second-tier" defendants. Representative parties might bring
these claims in relevant international fora or in U.S. district courts,o7 0
depending on where plaintiffs can sustain jurisdiction over defendants. For
example, the plight of Palauan women demonstrates great possibility in the
legal arena.17 1  During his impassioned analysis of "diplomats dither[ing]"
at the climate summits in Copenhagen and Cancun, Palau Ambassador to
the United Nations Stuart Beck decried the impotence of the UNFCCC
meetings while his island lost land and the capacity to grow taro.172 This
acutely impacts the women of the most vulnerable pacific islands. Beck
explained, "[i]f the ladies can't grow taro, and it's generally a matriarchal
task, they're going to move from that island. And that's a slow-moving
kind of depopulation, but it's a real one nonetheless. . . . It's death by a
thousand cuts, and every time somebody leaves the island, that's another
cut." 73 A claim brought by women taro growers against a variety of large
emitting entities might be an effective means of pursuing litigation and
galvanizing myriad smaller lawsuits to arrest growing greenhouse gas
emissions.
In addition to administrative efficiency, class action suits have been an
effective mechanism for pooling resources and leveling the playing field
between many similarly situated plaintiffs and powerful defendants in the
U.S. It is a potentially powerful mechanism in the international arena as
170 Kali Borkoski, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: What's at Stake, and For Whom?,
SCOTUS BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/kiobel-v-
royal-dutch-petroleum-whats-at-stake-and-for-whom/ (discussing whether the ATS can
apply even if all the violations occurred outside the United States).
171 See Friedman, supra note 52.
172 Friedman, supra note 52.
17 id.
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well; and has been contemplated by other scholars and practitioners.
Indeed, in her analysis of the feasibility of islanders seeking redress under
the ATS, RoseMary Reed suggests that "[w]hile it is possible for a single
individual or nation to bring this action, it may be even more powerful if
several nations band together to form a class action and litigate this issue
once." 74 Professor Phoenix Cai makes a similar suggestion in the context
of the World Trade Organization and expands on the promise of class
actions in the dispute settlement mechanism to pool benefits and risks-
including very damaging retaliation or extralegal contraction of aid.175
The class action regime proffered for the WTO might be instructive in
the international climate litigation context. When a member of the WTO
violates a rule or trade term, the affected party may bring a complaint under
the WTO's dispute settlement regime.176 The process and remedy for
developing nations, however, suffers from similar concerns of retaliation
and parties' uneven resources.177 In response, Professor Cai proposes a
class action type mechanism that would allow developing nations to pool
their complaints in cases against larger or more developed nations. 178
Importantly, the group of nations could also use the class action strategy
against emerging developing nations, such as China and India;179 and would
afford least-developed countries the right to join as a third party in the
dispute settlement process.180 Although there would be burdens and risks to
such an arrangement, particularly to the "lead" developing nation
plaintiff,181 there would be many systemic benefits to class action litigation.
Some of those benefits include: the ability to engage in litigation without
risking extrajudicial threats of retaliation and without the fear of lengthy
and costly litigation; the ability to bring suits that advance developing
174 Reed, supra note 50, at 423. The author made similar calls in the context of a
reparations claim. See generally Burkett, Climate Reparations, supra note 2.
175 See generally Cai, supra note 62. More than two-thirds of the 153 WTO member
nations are developing nations. Id. at 154. Cai explains, "despite their strength in numbers,
developing nations as a group rarely participate in dispute settlement, a core aspect of the
WTO. This is problematic because the WTO is essentially a self-enforcing system of
reciprocal trade rights that relies on proactive monitoring by all members." Id.
176 In fact, it is incumbent on each WTO member to "police its interests." Id. at 155.
According to Cai, "[w]hen developing nations fail to initiate cases, the result is both under-
enforcement of key WTO norms and skewed enforcement in favor of developed nations."
Id.
177 Other concerns operate. See id. at 153 (discussing the inadequacy of the
"prospective" WTO remedies, namely withdrawal of the offending measure or rule).
178 Id. at 157 (describing the proposal in a nutshell).
179 id.
180 Id.
"' Id. at 184-85.
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nation agendas and interests; the valuable opportunity for coalition-
building; and, perhaps most important, the benefits of greater developing
nation participation "in the WTO system as a whole, especially in terms of
perceived legitimacy." 82
In the climate context, class action litigation can serve similar functions
as proposed in the WTO context and remain consistent with what it seeks to
achieve in the larger societal context. As Cai explains:
Class actions serve important societal functions. They are often used as a tool
to compensate for small losses and enforce regulations. They enable less
powerful groups to act as private attorneys general. They have also been
effectively employed as a means for lasting social change, as during the civil
rights era. As a result of all these dynamics, class actions more deeply embed
social values embodied in laws in the greater society by giving voice to the
otherwise voiceless. 183
Based on the climate forecast for small islands, it is critical for them to
acquire that voice rapidly.
C. Interest Convergence and the Power ofPublicity
The rule of law must reflect the interests of the entire international
community.
-President Johnson Toribiong, Republic of Palau184
The value of all of the proposed claims is perhaps greatest in their ability
to spark and sustain a conversation about the disproportionate harms
suffered by small island states. Publicity, the airing of injuries, and the
shaming of large emitters might spur measurable reparative developments
depending on the political moment in which it occurs. Perhaps the most
common refrain from practitioners, scholars, and vulnerable communities
alike is that engaging in the uphill battle of climate litigation, with the
accompanying losses and false starts, remains important for its story-telling
capacity. This is particularly true in the human rights context. It
182 Id. at 182-83, 189.
Id. at 196.
184 Press Conference on Request for International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on
Climate Change, United Nations, (Feb. 3, 2012) available at http://www.un.org/news/
briefings/docs/2012/120203 ICJ.doc.htm [hereinafter UN Press Conference on Request for
International Court ofJustice Advisory Opinion on Climate Change].
185 See discussion in Burkett, supra note 68. See also LW Press Conference on Request
for International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, supra note 184
("[S]ince [twenty] years of climate-change negotiations had shown that every State saw the
phenomenon differently-as an economic problem, or an issue of geopolitics. 'For us, it's
664
2013 / A JUSTICE PARADOX
served that purpose for the claimants in the Inuit action brought before the
IACHR.187 As more stories are told perhaps they collectively will have the
power to incite rapid emissions reduction and aggressive and concerted
adaptation action from the largest emitters. This section explores the power
of shaming and the relevance of interest convergence in pursuing claims
today despite their real or perceived shortcomings.
The story-telling value of these claims becomes clear when viewed
alongside stories that are not told. Publicizing injustices has the power to
catalyze efforts to redress those injustices. One example is in the redress
claims of the innocent victims of the No Gun Ri massacre, in which U.S.
soldiers killed hundreds'88 of Koreans fleeing their war torn villages.189
Although the massacre occurred in 1950,190 it was difficult to break the
"curtain of secrecy shrouding the case" until the story was finally told by
the Associated Press on September 30, 1999, some four decades later.' 9'
Prior to that, the Korean government did not help the surviving victims
about survival.' The International Court of Justice process would raise awareness of that
reality, in addition to providing guidance to the negotiation track."); Sinden, supra note 71,
at 185 (arguing that even if a lawsuit "does not ultimately result in an enforceable order
ending gas flaring," framing it as a "human rights issue still serves an important rhetorical
purpose by bringing into stark relief the power imbalance at root."); Reed, supra note 50, at
427 ("While such a claim would cover new ground legally, the foundation in international
human rights law is sufficient to make the claim. A claim such as this would certainly
gather significant media attention. Thus, even if the claim were not legally successful, it
could still be a success by bringing the world's attention to the problem."); Jacobs, supra
note 39, at 108 ("Tuvalu's proposed suit against the United States in the International Court
of Justice is as much about obtaining relief as it is about obtaining a more public and
hopefully sympathetic arena.").
186 Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A "Social Healing
Through Justice" Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu
Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 39 (2009) ("Human rights norms remain
largely aspirational.").
187 See id; see also Osofsky, supra note 45 (stating that Inuit representatives intended the
petition to educate and encourage the U.S. to join the community of nations and even if the
petition could not force behavioral change in the U.S. the petition puts pressure on the U.S.
to engage in dialogue about alternatives).
See Tae-Ung Baik, A War Crime Against an Ally's Civilians: The No Gun Ri
Massacre, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 455,463 (2001).
189 See generally Tae-Ung Baik, The Remedies for the Victims of the Jeju April Third
Incidents, in RETHINKING HISTORICAL INJUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA,
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 94 (Gi-Wook Shin et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Remedies for the
Victims]. For a description of the massacre of innocent Koreans by U.S. soldiers, see Baik,
supra note 188 at 463-65.
190 The massacre continued from July 26 to July 29, 1950. Baik, supra note 188, at 463-
65.
.9. Id. at 502.
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gather information regarding the massacre, arguing that claims against the
U.S. might help the North Korean government.192 With the news reports,
however, the Korean government finally made remedies available to the
victims, including compensation, memorials, and a museum. 193 Other
examples of the power of publicity tell similar stories of eventual repair and
reconciliation.194
An important complement to the powerful public narrative is a receptive
audience, particularly if that audience is the world leader small island
nations seek to influence. Further, the offending party is more likely to
remedy the injustice complained of if it is in its interest. In the international
context this is the geo-political parallel to Derrick Bell's interest
convergence theory, which Bell employed in the context of American racial
politics.195 Eric Yamamoto and Ashley Obrey argue that a country's desire
to achieve democratic legitimacy might occur at the same moment a
community or country is seeking redress for harms suffered because of that
democracy's unjust actions.19 6 The perception of a government's validity in
terms of democratic governance and its commitment to civil and human
rights determines its "democratic legitimacy." 9 7 Through the lens of the
interest convergence theory, therefore, a dominant power will "countenance
civil and human rights advances only when those gains simultaneously
serve its larger political interests."' 98 Yamamoto and Obrey argue that this
may have allowed for rights advances in the United States for groups such
as Native Hawaiians when the Obama Administration's first term
commenced.'99 Although the latter may have been an overly sanguine
192 Id. at 502-03.
' Baik, Remedies for the Victims, supra note 188, at 94.
194 See, e.g., Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 186 at 41 (citing international criticism of
America's racist Jim Crow democracy during the Cold War and President Reagan's reversal
in his prior opposition to Japanese American redress in 1988). Interest convergence was
also at play in instances Yamamoto & Obrey cite. See also Burkett, Climate Reparations,
supra note 2.
195 See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr. Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518 (1980).
196 See Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 186, at 41. ("For modern redress advocates, this
kind of American self-interest in redress lies at the heart of Derrick Bell's theory of interest-
convergence-that a dominant power will countenance civil and human rights advances only
when those gains simultaneously serve its larger political interests."). Id.
197 Id. at 40.
198 Id. ("Whether a country heals persisting wounds is increasingly viewed as integral...
globally, to claim legitimacy in the eyes of the world as a democracy truly committed to
civil and human rights (which affects a country's standing to participate in matters of
international security and responsible economic development).)." Id at 7.
9 Id at 41, 50. ("Although reparations claims rarely succeed in court, most politically
successful reparations or reconciliation movements have been inspired and shaped at crucial
666
2013 / A JUSTICE PARADOX
assessment of President Obama's approach to reparatory action, elements of
Yamamoto and Obrey's analysis may be instructive nonetheless.
In the climate context President Obama has repeatedly articulated
concern about dangerous climate impacts.2 0 0 The most recent statement in
his 2013 inaugural address suggested a recommitment to the hard work of
reigning in U.S. emissions.20 1 And, some are more optimistic as a result.202
Evidence of the applicability of this theory is legion and militates in
favor of a continuous drumbeat of litigation and story-telling. Litigation,
according to Yamamoto and Obrey, "serves as a lightning rod for
recognition and responsibility and as a bully pulpit for community
organizing about the injustice and need for system-wide reconstruction and
reparation." 2 0 3 They further state:
Sociolegal research suggests that international human rights claims are widely
publicized through court challenges, in certain political settings, and alter over
time what both government policymakers and the public come to view as
'right,' 'natural,' 'just,' or 'in their interest.' This in turn can help build public
pressure.204
That need for pressure is widely recognized. Unsympathetic to the U.S.'s
protestations to Palau's request for an advisory opinion and similar actions,
Bangladesh Ambassador to the United Nations Abdul Momen complained:
"The U.S. is saying, 'We are trying, but this is making it harder.' But
unless you pressure, things never happen. ,205 Even conservative
commentators in the U.S. acknowledge the important catalyst litigation can
be, remarking, "[i]f you have sensitive climate change treaty negotiations
points by litigation."). Id. at 40. This is an effort that might correct for the legitimacy lost
under the Bush Administration, Yamamoto and Obrey argue. Id. at 41 (citing Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo Bay, secret detention centers, and post-9/11 domestic civil liberties violations).
200 See, e.g., Jeff Mason, At Fundraisers Obama Talks Climate, Regaining US. House,
REUTERS, (Apr. 4, 2013, 1:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/04/us-usa-
campaign-obama-fundraising-idUSBRE93305920130404. Although, President Obama's
prior statements have yielded little tangible progress.
201 Richard W. Stevenson & John M. Broder, Speech Gives Climate Goals Center State,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2013 at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/us/
politics/climate-change-prominent-in-obamas-inaugural-address.html? r=0 ("'We will
respond to the threat of climate change, knowing that failure to do so would betray our
children and future generations,' Mr. Obama said on Monday at the start of eight sentences
on the subject, more than he devoted to any other specific area.").
202 For example, Bangladesh Ambassador to the United Nations Abdul Momen, said he is
confident the United States is going to be more receptive under a second Obama term.
Friedman, supra note 52.
203 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 186, at 40.
204 id.
205 Friedman, supra note 52.
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going on, you have a compliant president and there is some looming
international lawsuit pending, it can't help but move the negotiations
forward." 2 06  Further, it appears convincing that a country's "quest for
enhanced international stature can shape that country's evolving responses
to redress claims." 207 This kind of interest convergence at the international
level is also understood as correcting for the "reputational costs" of an
action, or failure to act. 208 There is some skepticism regarding the efficacy
of reputational costs in the climate context.2 09 Indeed, the past twenty years
suggest that these costs, if sizeable, do not operate in the current
circumstances. 2 10 It might mean, however, that the hard work of SIDS
litigation is not yet done and, therefore, the costs experienced by powerful
large emitters have not yet been fully meted out.
IV. CONCLUSION
The concept of a "justice paradox" has been employed before. In his
article Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, Dean Robert Scott describes
the recurring conflict between effecting "present justice"-"[d]oes the law
accomplish justice between the parties to any particular dispute?"-and
"future justice"-"[d]oes the law appropriately regulate the conduct of
other parties likely to have similar disputes" and make it less likely that
similar misfortune will befall others.2 1 1 As Scott demonstrates, arbiters
must meet both present and future justice to achieve a just outcome.2 12
They are, however, almost always intractably opposed." Scott suggests
206 Id. (quoting Steven Groves, a fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think
tank).
207 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 186, at 52.
208 See Badrinarayana, supra note 63, at 282; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1827 (2002); Beth A. Simmons, The
Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT'L ORG. 573, 574 (2000), available at
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/LegalizationlntlMonetaryAffairs.pdf; see
also Cai, supra note 62, at 181 (arguing that an additional value of class action litigation at
the WTO is that the reputation harms of non-compliance or foot-dragging in compliance
increases with the number of complainants).
209 Badrinarayana, supra note 63, at 283-84. "For example, core nations like the United
States appear unaffected by the reputation cost of not signing the Kyoto Protocol, even
though without its participation, international efforts to reduce emissions-and
consequently-alleviate the threat to sovereign rights of Tuvalu and Maldives will prove
ineffective." Id. at 284.
210 id
211 Scott, supra note 6.
212 id
213 Id. at 329-30 ("The legal profession is searching, even struggling, to define its role in
a changing society. Much of this angst comes from a feeling that the legal community
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that the legal profession abandon the handwringing that this paradox
produces and embrace the lessons of Chaos Theory. In essence, instead of
attempting to resolve the paradox, the profession should accept its chaotic
nature-contradictions, disorder, and all.214
It is not clear that this is an acceptable posture in the face of a changing
climate and the injustices at base. Indeed, one can understand the paradox
as articulated in this article as an antecedent one. In others words, while the
law vacillates between the demands of present and future justice, it
completely-and consistently-ignores the needs of the most vulnerable at
the international scale. It has in its geopolitical context failed to provide
clearly viable recourse for small island litigants. The law, therefore, moves
along a spectrum that continually favors the most powerful and,
accordingly, excludes the most vulnerable. The most vulnerable, then, are
left with the formidable task of situating their claims within the constricted
band of law's current patterns. The extent to which the legal infrastructure
is able to effect just outcomes is circumscribed and may continue to be so if
small island states are unable to pursue the patchwork of legal avenues, a
few of which this article highlights.
A promising element of Scott's elucidation of the Justice Paradox,
however, is that it leaves open the possibility for improvement through
evolution. Scott writes: "Do not despair because law has fundamental
contradictions. It is the very tension whose resolution we seek that keeps
our legal system in a dynamic state of continuous renewal and repair. It is
the dynamic of the Justice Paradox that keeps our legal system alive." 215 If
the current patterns that consistently exclude at present are susceptible to
the dynamism Scott describes, then it is feasible that in its next iteration the
law will yield swift and comprehensive solutions to one of the greatest
challenges in human history.
This article has attempted to take stock of viable legal avenues posited to
date and push the conversation regarding effective legal and political
avenues available to small island states. It does so fully cognizant of the
formidable challenges of climate litigation in the current geo-political
environment. It also does so fully aware of the bleak climate forecast for
islands, and the rest of the globe. On balance, therefore, it hopes to make
hasn't made much progress in resolving what I will term the 'Justice Paradox."').
214 Id. at 349 ("So what is the lesson? We can either continue to challenge the theories of
previous legal movements, or we can come to accept that any new movement must recycle
old doctrine, but in doing so, will ultimately fail to construct an encompassing theory of law.
There is no algorithm for a just society. Chaos in law describes human life. Thus, we in law
must continuously be self-conscious, self-criticizing, self-analyzing, but above all, patient
and accepting of the limits of our discipline.").
215 Id. at 350.
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clear that pressing this litigation is the only real option available. If there
was one message Jon Van Dyke sought to make clear during his own work
on the matter, it was that the other option is simply unviable.
